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Sensitization and Extraordinary Persistence
By Benjamin Keefer*
We propose a behavioral model in which an agent’s attitude toward
loss is affected by memories of prior losses. Due to the availability
heuristic, memories of prior loss sensitize the agent and increase the
weight assigned to prospective losses. Because memories of firsttime experiences exhibit multi-decade persistence in recall, our
model helps explain recent empirical findings that major events can
have multi-decade effects on choices.
consistency

with

stochastic

We further demonstrate

dominance,

so

that

sensitized

individuals will prefer distributions demonstrating first- and
second-order stochastic dominance. In an overlapping generations
version of Tirole’s (2006) liquidity-scale framework, our model
generates procyclical investment.

*Keefer, Carleton College, 1 N. College St., Northfield, MN, 55057 (e-mail: bkeefer@carleton.edu). I am deeply indebted
to my dissertation advisors (in alphabetical order) Fahad Khalil, Jacques Lawarrée, and Stephen Turnovsky for all of their
help and guidance on an earlier form of this work. I am also grateful to J. Leahy and two anonymous referees for their
helpful comments and discussion. Finally, I would like to thank my colleagues at Carleton College, participants at the
2014 LAC Macro Workshop, and participants of the MTI Brownbags series at the University of Washington for feedback
on earlier drafts.

JEL classification: D81; E44; G32
“Sensitization, a form of learned fear in which a person or an experimental animal
learns to respond strongly to an otherwise neutral stimulus.” —Eric Kandel, 2000
Nobel Laureate in Physiology or Medicine
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1. Introduction
In macroeconomics and finance, the preferences typically used assume that
preferences regarding risk and loss are stable. Yet as noted by Dillenberger and
Rozen (2015), recent empirical work suggests that an individual’s attitude toward
risk or loss may be affected by past experiences. For example, the literature has
recently shown that shocks such as war, natural disasters, and even scary movies
can cause individuals to act more risk-averse.1
Although there are existing models that generate time-varying risk or loss
attitudes through time-varying habits and reference points, these habit- and
reference point-based models have trouble explaining the magnitude of the
duration in the changes in risk preferences.

For example, both habits and

reference points are thought to mostly adjust within a decade according to
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), yet three
recent works compellingly document that shocks to risk preferences may
demonstrate multi-decade persistence. First, Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011)
study CEOs from 1980 to 1994 and find that CEOs born before the Great
Depression finance their corporate investments more conservatively than their
post-depression contemporaries forty years later. Second, Schoar and Zuo (2011)
find that CEOs who experienced a recession at age 24 (roughly when they entered
the job market) made more conservative career choices throughout their careers.
Third, Knüpfer, Rantapuska, and Sarvimäki (2014) document how individuals
more exposed to the Finnish financial crisis in the 1990s were less likely to
participate in the stock market over twelve years later.
We refer to the emerging finding of multi-decade persistence in shocks to risk
preferences as extraordinary persistence, and this paper is motivated to use
models of gain-loss preferences to understand potential behavioral causes of this
1

See Kim and Lee (2014), Cameron and Shah (2015), and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2013).
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extraordinary persistence. We believe that understanding this puzzling finding is
important for macroeconomics and finance.

Understanding the source of

extraordinary persistence should be important to finance because of Cochrane’s
(2011, p. 1091) observation that most financial “puzzles and anomalies that we
face amount to [variation in time- and/or risk-preferences] we do not understand.”
Due to the recent emphasis in incorporating financial markets within
macroeconomic models, understanding the source of extraordinary persistence
should also be important to macroeconomics.
In this paper, we develop a behavioral model of sensitization using gain-loss
preferences

to

explain

how

time-varying

extraordinary persistence might arise.

loss

attitudes

demonstrating

Our model of sensitization allows an

individual to be sensitized by past realizations of loss: agents who experienced
loss more frequently in their past will exhibit a greater tendency to focus on the
potential for future loss. Consequently, these individuals should demonstrate a
lower tolerance for bearing prospective losses in the future. Further, the model
makes predictions regarding the persistence of changes in loss attitudes.
According to our model, the duration to which a past loss will sensitize an
individual will depend on the nature of the loss. In particular, our model predicts
that losses characterized by first-time experiences during young adulthood are
capable of persistently sensitizing an individual for over forty years, whereas the
effects of most other types of loss should begin to fade within five years.
To model sensitization, we first consider a simple setting in which an agent who
lives for two periods faces a lottery in the second period that is known to be
independent of all first-period realizations. We start with the gain-loss utility
developed by Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). In the absence of sensitization,
the agent’s choice in the second period depends on how the second period’s
distribution relates to the reference lottery, which in turn depends on that period’s
distribution. Because the lotteries are known to be independent, realizations from
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the first period do not affect the agent’s second-period choice in the absence of
sensitization.
In the presence of sensitization, preferences become path-dependent as past
experiences of loss cause the agent to focus on the potential for future loss.
Following Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), we assume that rational expectations
inform the reference lottery each period. For tractability, we restrict the reference
lottery to the first moments of the associated distributions. As a result, at the end
of the first period the agent will compare all realizations to their expected values.
All realizations short of the expected values trigger losses, whereas all realizations
in excess of the expected values trigger gains. The agent’s preferences in the
second period will now depend on the frequency of loss in the first period. If
losses are never experienced, a loss-averse agent’s preferences are characterized
by loss-aversion but not sensitization. If losses are experienced, a loss-averse
agent’s preferences are now characterized by loss-aversion and sensitization. Past
losses are said to sensitize the agent, so that greater weight is placed on the
potential for loss in the second period. Once sensitized, it is as if weight is
transferred from the coefficient on gains to the coefficients on losses within the
agent’s gain-loss utility function.
We identify two distinct psychological channels that we believe are consistent
with our model of sensitization described above.

The first psychological

phenomenon is referred to by Kahneman (2011) as the availability heuristic, and
this channel generates time-varying attitudes toward loss.

According to this

heuristic, the weight that is assigned to a potential outcome (e.g., gain or loss)
depends on the underlying availability of the outcome. Kahneman (2011) states
that the availability of any outcome in turn depends on its emotional charge,
vividness, ease of recall, and the degree to which the contemplated outcome is
consistent with autobiographical memories. Based on Kahneman’s description,
we hypothesize that the more frequently that one experiences loss, the greater the
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ease of recall, vividness, and emotional charge these collective losses
demonstrate.

As frequent losses strengthen these availability factors, the

availability heuristic will cause the individual to assign greater weight to future
prospective losses.
The second psychological phenomenon is the reminiscence bump, and this
channel generates the extraordinary persistence found in our model. According to
psychologists

studying

the

availability

of

remembered

experiences,

autobiographical memories of first-time experiences from young adulthood have
been consistently shown to remain vivid, emotionally charged, and easily recalled
forty years later. 2 In our model, these memories’ persistent ease of recall,
vividness, and emotional charge trigger a persistent distortion in availability,
which in turn persistently affects the agent’s attitude toward gain and loss through
the availability heuristic.
Our model of sensitization is also influenced by Kandel’s (2001) description,
and this influence causes preferences to inherit three distinctive properties. First,
preferences characterized by sensitization are adaptive because Kandel describes
sensitization as a “form of learned fear.” In our model, sensitization is said to be
learned and adaptive because the degree of sensitization will depend on the
agent’s past experiences.

Second, as a “form of learned fear,” we interpret

sensitization to be a fear of loss that is formed by prior experiences of loss. As it
is illogical that an individual would develop a fear of gains, a second property of
sensitization is asymmetry. In our model, first-time losses experienced when
young will cause the individual to permanently shift her focus to the potential for
future losses, whereas gains will not affect the agent’s focus. Finally, following
Kandel (2001) we model sensitization as a “form of learned fear” that operates
2

See Rathbone, Moulin, and Conway (2008) for a recent summary of this literature and Rubin, Rahhal, and Poon (1998)
for an earlier but more comprehensive review.

6

across stimuli. As an illustration of sensitization, Kandel argues that after hearing
a noise similar to a gunshot, an individual will automatically become more
alarmed by an otherwise neutral tap on the shoulder.

Similarly, aversive

realizations in our model will sensitize the agent to future losses even when the
original aversive realizations are known to contain no informational content about
the future.
Though sensitization includes these three unusual properties, the preferences of
sensitization are shown to be well-behaved in a general setting to the extent that
they exhibit consistency with the established notions of first- and second-order
stochastic dominance. In order to demonstrate consistency, we start with Kőszegi
and Rabin’s (2006, 2007) gain-loss preferences. To enhance the tractability of the
model of sensitization in general settings, we restrict the reference lottery to the
first moment of the associated lottery’s distribution.3 We first show that these
modified preferences will be consistent with the notions of first- and second-order
stochastic dominance in the absence of sensitization.

We then show that

sensitization is also consistent with the notions of first- and second-order
stochastic dominance, even under loss-neutrality.
After demonstrating that sensitization is well-behaved, this paper then studies
sensitization’s macroeconomic consequences using Tirole’s (2006) liquidity-scale
framework. In our version of Tirole’s framework, financial entrepreneurs are
assumed to manage investment projects while subject to potential cost overruns.
If entrepreneurs’ liquidity ratios sufficiently meet the realized cost overrun, their
projects are successful and generate abundant capital per unit of investment. If
3

This restriction transforms Kőszegi and Rabin’s (2006, 2007) preferences that depend on what Yitzhaki (1982) refers to
as Gini’s Mean Difference into preferences that depend on what Ogryczak and Ruszczyński (2001) refer to as Mean
Absolute Semideviation. Because both general types of preferences have been demonstrated to be consistent with firstorder and second-order stochastic dominance, our first-moment restriction will preserve consistency with stochastic
dominance. In fact, our paper reproduces the required parameter restriction 𝜂 𝜆 − 1 < 1 needed for consistency in the
unrestricted preferences of Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) as demonstrated by Masatlioglu and Raymond (2014) as well
as the Mean Absolute Semideviation preferences of Ogryczak and Ruszczyński (2001).
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their liquidity ratios prove insufficient, their projects are unsuccessful and
generate little capital.

In this paper, the choice of liquidity ratio for each

generation’s representative entrepreneur characterizes how that generation
manages risk at the intensive margin, whereas the scale of the investment project
characterizes how that generation manages risk at the extensive margin.
In the presence of either sensitization or increases in loss-aversion, agents in the
model are incentivized to reduce their sensations of net loss through distortions on
the extensive (i.e., the scale of the investment project) and intensive margins (i.e.,
the project’s liquidity ratio). Higher sensations of net loss reduce the agents’
willingness to borrow, causing the scale of the project to fall on the extensive
margin and is consistent with procyclical investment behavior.4 With regard to
the intensive margin, we find that the distortion introduced by sensitization
critically depends on the probability of loss. When the probability of loss is low,
increases in sensations of net loss cause agents to hold larger liquidity ratios. As a
result, liquidity ratios become countercyclical when the probability of loss is low.
Yet when the probability of loss is high, increases in sensations of net loss cause
agents to hold smaller liquidity ratios.

As a result, liquidity ratios become

procyclical when the probability of loss is high.

We believe that the

counterintuitive property that increases in sensations of net loss may cause risktaking to be procyclical at the intensive margin deserves further consideration in
the macroeconomic literature.
Our model’s theoretical predictions are generally consistent with the empirical
literature. The model’s prediction that borrowing falls after realized losses is
consistent with the empirical finding by Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011) that
CEOs born before the Great Depression are more hesitant to borrow to fund
corporate investments than their post-depression contemporaries over forty years
4

This sensation of net loss may include loss-aversion and sensitization as well as the interaction between the two.
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later. To the extent that normal economic conditions are consistent with relatively
low probabilities of loss, our model would predict that liquidity ratios are
countercyclical, which is consistent with the empirical findings of Kato (2006).
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the
literature. Section 3 presents a first-moment approximation of the preferences of
Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007).

Section 3 then demonstrates that this

approximation preserves consistency between loss-aversion and stochastic
dominance.

Section 4 develops the preferences of sensitization and, as this

paper’s first main contribution, discusses how these sensitized preferences induce
time-varying risk preferences through time-varying attitudes toward loss. Section
4 then develops this paper’s second contribution by demonstrating that
sensitization is consistent with stochastic dominance under slightly more
restrictive parameter assumptions. As this paper’s final contribution, Section 5
introduces an overlapping generations version of Tirole’s (2006) liquidity-scale
framework to study sensitization’s effects on the cyclicality of investment and
liquidity using comparative statics following an increase in realized losses.
Section 6 concludes with general findings, while the appendix contains the proofs
for the propositions of consistency of first-order stochastic dominance with both
loss-aversion and sensitization.
2. Relationship to the Economic Literature
This paper is motivated by the finding that major economic shocks can affect
risk preferences at the microeconomic level for decades. Four papers effectively
document the persistence of these shocks. First, Malmendier, Tate, and Yan
(2011) study CEOs from 1980 to 1994 and find that CEOs born before the Great
Depression finance their corporate investments more conservatively than their
post-depression contemporaries. Second, Knüpfer, Rantapuska, and Sarvimäki
(2014) document how individuals more exposed to the Finnish financial crisis in
the 1990s were less likely to participate in the stock market twelve years later.
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Third, Schoar and Zuo (2011) find that CEOs who experienced a recession at age
24 (roughly when they entered the job market) made more conservative career
choices throughout their careers. Finally, using a Markov-Switching model to
estimate shifts in aggregate risk regimes, Gordon and St-Amour (2000) find that
risk preferences vary over time at the aggregate level and that shifts in aggregate
risk regimes persist for roughly ten years.
Traditionally, time-varying risk preferences have been modeled through timevarying discount rates.

Given the recognized importance of time-varying

discount rates to understanding financial anomalies, the discipline has expended
considerable effort toward understanding the source of time-varying discount
rates.5 Perhaps the most common approach, and the approach employed in this
paper, is to use time-varying risk preferences to generate time-varying discount
rates.

Yet many of the seminal works in the time-varying risk preferences

literature, such as Campbell and Cochrane’s habit-based model (1999) and
Barberis, Huang, and Santos’ (2001) reference-based model, largely preceded the
recent empirical findings discussed in the four papers highlighted above. It is
therefore not surprising that the degree of persistence generated in these works
would appear insufficient to explain the multi-decade persistence that has only
recently been documented.6
Within the literature on time-varying risk and loss attitudes, the paper most
similar to ours is Dillenberger and Rozen’s (2015), yet there are also important
differences. This paper is similar to ours to the extent that both generate timevarying risk preferences consistent with the psychological phenomena
5

One of the earliest and most important financial anomalies was the finding of excess volatility by Shiller (1981) and
LeRoy and Porter (1981). See Farmer, Nourry, and Venditti (2012) and Dillenberger and Rozen (2015) for a
comprehensive review of this literature.
6
Since habits and reference points are generally believed to adjust within a decade, it is not clear that any model
generating time-varying risk aversion through either sticky habits or sticky reference points alone would be capable of
generating multi-decade persistence of shocks to risk preferences.
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Dillenberger and Rozen refer to as the reinforcement and primacy effects.7 The
differences between the two papers stem from differences in motivation. Whereas
Dillenberger and Rozen primarily focus on developing a model consistent with
the reinforcement and primacy effects, this paper primarily focuses on
understanding the cause of the extraordinary persistence found in the empirical
literature.
The use of loss-aversion as the foundation for our paper allows us to identify
the distinct behavioral and psychological phenomena that generate extraordinary
persistence. Identifying these phenomena allow for predictions regarding the
reinforcement and primacy effects that are more nuanced than found in
Dillenberger and Rozen (2015). First, our model predicts that the reinforcement
effect is moderated by the availability heuristic. Our model therefore predicts that
past economic losses such as the Great Depression should affect economic
choices more than other types of losses such as wars. This is because memories
of economic losses should be more available and salient than memories of other
losses when contemplating economic choices. This prediction may explain why
the effects of the Great Depression on economic choices as documented by
Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011) appear more consistently statistically
significant than the effects of the Korean War on economic choices as
documented Kim and Lee (2014). Second, our model predicts that the primacy
effect demonstrates temporal discontinuities. Whereas Dillenberger and Rozen’s
model allows all shocks to permanently affect risk preferences, our model
suggests that the effect on risk preferences depend on the availability of the
memory of the shock.

Because only memories of first-time experiences or

experiences from young adulthood have been shown to remain persistently
7

In our model, the reinforcement effect would suggest that losses make one more loss-averse, whereas the primacy effect
suggests that first-time or early losses have larger and more persistent effects on risk and loss attitudes.
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available with other memories generally fading in five years time, our model
predicts that only first-time experiences or experiences from young adulthood are
likely to permanently affect risk and loss attitudes.
Although this paper’s primary contribution is directed toward the time-varying
risk preferences literature, it also relates to other research in economics, such as
the availability heuristic, the Two Systems model, and Shiller’s (2014) Nobel
Lecture discussion of the sociological forces that he believes drive animal spirits
and bubbles.
Starting with the economic literature on the availability heuristic, we note that
although this literature is exceedingly small, there are two notable works related
to ours.

First, Akerlof and Yellen (1987) similarly discuss the potential

macroeconomic implications of the availability heuristic and other behavioral
phenomena. Second, Fuster, Laibson, and Mendel (2010) formally model how
similar psychological phenomena, including the availability heuristic, could bias
expectations and generate excess volatility in asset markets. Although this paper
deviates from these two by identifying the availability heuristic with loss attitudes
instead of expectations, we follow the bounded rationality approach of these two
works by developing an equilibrium in which rational expectations and
availability biases simultaneously coexist.

Specifically, by identifying the

availability heuristic as potentially contributing to long-run sensitization (a form
of learned fear), we argue that people may be aware that their risk preferences are
biased toward magnifying losses and yet be unable to correct these biases. For
example, individuals scarred by an event like the Great Depression during their
youth may know that their fear of future loss is irrational. Yet, these irrational
fears may still bias individual behavior as distorted fixations on loss may not be
easily addressed by Bayes’ rule.
This paper’s use of the availability heuristic relies on a psychological model of
human decision-making endorsed by Kahneman (2011). This reliance causes our
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work to be related to the literature studying what Kahneman refers to as the Two
Systems model. Kahneman argues that people’s decisions are informed by both
logic-driven beliefs (e.g., rational expectations) and emotions (e.g., distorted fears
of loss). In his view, emotions are influenced by the availability heuristic, which
in this paper is modeled through a distorted focus on loss. We are not the first to
consider the economic implications of what Kahneman (2011) refers to as the
Two Systems model, but to the best of our knowledge we are the first to explicitly
analyze the implications of the Two Systems model on risk and loss attitudes.
Other authors have explicitly used a Two Systems framework to study primarily
microeconomic phenomena. For example, Brocas and Carrillo (2008) use a Two
Systems model to study impatience, and Fudenberg and Levine (2006) use it to
study self-control.
Finally, this paper studies how a generation’s collective experiences may shape
future economic decision-making, which parallels the discussion of animal spirits
in Shiller’s (2014) Nobel Lecture.

While discussing sociological factors

contributing to animal spirits’ ability to affect asset prices, Shiller cites
Durkheim’s notion of “the ‘collective consciousness,’ that represents the shared
beliefs, attitudes, and moral judgments that characterize a time” (p. 1496). He
further cites Halbwachs’ notion of “the ‘collective memory,’ the set of facts that
are widely remembered at any point of time, but that are forgotten eventually if
word of mouth and active media do not perpetuate their memory” (pp. 14961497). This paper contributes to Shiller’s discussion by suggesting a generation’s
persistent memories of first-time economic losses from young adulthood (i.e., part
of their “collective memory”) may generate distortions in loss attitudes, (i.e.,
alterations in their “collective consciousness”) and thereby affect asset prices.
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3. Sufficient Conditions for Consistency Between Loss-Aversion and
Stochastic Dominance
In this section we first demonstrate consistency between loss-aversion and firstand second-order stochastic dominance when reference lotteries are approximated
by their first moments.8 That is, loss-averse individuals will prefer distributions
that first- and second-order stochastically dominate others. Then in the next
section, we demonstrate consistency between sensitization and first- and secondorder stochastic dominance when reference lotteries are approximated by their
first moments.
For tractability, we approximate the reference lottery employed by Kőszegi and
Rabin (2006, 2007) with its first-order moment. We employ this first-moment
approximation because it enhances the tractability of our model of sensitization in
general settings while still allowing reference lotteries to be determined by
expectations as argued by Kőszegi and Rabin (2006).9,10 To the extent that
actions are largely driven by heuristics as argued by Kahneman (2011), this firstmoment approximation may even better characterize the bounded-rationality of
real-world agents.
Starting with the necessary notation, suppose an individual (she) is loss-averse
and considers two lotteries over some monetary payoffs 𝑦 with cumulative

8

Although Kőszegi and Rabin (2007) and Masatlioglu and Raymond (2014) have already provided proofs of consistency
with stochastic dominance, this section establishes that consistency is still preserved under the first-moment approximation
that will be used in the model of sensitization.
9
This tractability assumption is not without costs. Besides being less general for non-binary distributions, one additional
consequence of this assumption is that it will make individuals more tolerant of risk. Consider an example of a job-market
candidate contemplating three potential salary offers, 𝑦! > 𝑦! > 𝑦! and in which the middle observation coincides with
the mean of the distribution, 𝑦! = 𝜇. If the reference lottery is determined by its first moment, Equation (3.2𝑎) would
predict that the individual would not experience any gain or loss when 𝑦! is offered because the individual’s expectation 𝜇
was exactly met. In contrast, if the entire reference lottery is considered, then according to Equation (3.1a), the individual
would compare 𝑦! with both 𝑦! and 𝑦! and experience a net loss.
10
Our preferences of sensitization do not require this tractability assumption. Because our model of sensitization can be
thought to shift weight from gains to losses in proportion to the availability of losses, we could also construct a (less
tractable) model of sensitization using the unrestricted reference lotteries of Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). We prefer
this first-moment approximation strictly for its enhanced tractability in general settings.
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density functions 𝐹(𝑦) and 𝐺(𝑦) and probability density functions 𝑓(𝑦) and
𝑔(𝑦), respectively. Using the reference lottery concept of Kőszegi and Rabin
(2006, 2007) and assuming loss-aversion, risk-neutrality, and constant sensitivity,
when 𝑦 is realized the individual’s sense of gain depends on how 𝑦 compares to
all realizations (probability-weighted) that are relatively more adverse than 𝑦.11 If
the lottery with cdf 𝐹(𝑦) is chosen, then the individual achieves gain: 𝜂

!
!!

𝑦−

𝑦 𝑓 𝑦 𝑑𝑦, in which 𝜂 can be interpreted as the gain-loss coefficient. In contrast,
the sense of loss triggered by realization 𝑦 depends on how 𝑦 compares to all
realizations (probability-weighted) that are more favorable than 𝑦. If the lottery
with
𝜂𝜆

!
!

cdf

𝐹(𝑦)

is

chosen,

then

the

individual

achieves

loss:

𝑦 − 𝑦 𝑓 𝑦 𝑑(𝑦), in which 𝜆 > 1 captures the coefficient of loss-aversion.

Thus, when 𝑦 is realized, the sense of net loss experienced is given by:
𝜂

!
!!

𝑦 − 𝑦 𝑓 𝑦 𝑑𝑦 + 𝜂𝜆

!
!

𝑦 − 𝑦 𝑓 𝑦 𝑑(𝑦). The total ex-post utility, which

combines the normal risk-neutral consumptive utility 𝑦 with the gain-loss utility is
therefore:
!

3.1𝑎 𝑈 𝑦 |𝐹 = 𝑦 + 𝜂

!

𝑦 − 𝑦 𝑓 𝑦 𝑑𝑦 + 𝜂𝜆
!!

𝑦 − 𝑦 𝑓 𝑦 𝑑𝑦.
!

As revealed in Equation 3.1𝑎 , Kőszegi and Rabin’s (2006, 2007) model
requires the entire distribution to determine the reference lottery from which gains
and losses are calculated.
Whereas Equation 3.1𝑎 demonstrated how the reference lottery determined
the ex-post utility, we wish to show that calculations of expected utility are
somewhat less tractable and depend on a double-integral. For each possible
realization 𝑦, the individual must weight 𝑦’s relative contribution to expected

11

Constant sensitivity corresponds to Assumption A3’ in Kőszegi and Rabin (2006).
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utility by its probability.

If the lottery with cdf 𝐹(⋅ ) is chosen, then the

individual’s expected utility is given by:
3.1𝑏 𝐸 𝑈 𝑦 𝐹
=𝐸 𝑦
!

+

𝑓 𝑦
!!
!

∗ 𝜂

!

𝑦 − 𝑦 𝑓 𝑦 𝑑𝑦 + 𝜂𝜆
!!

𝑦−𝑦 𝑓 𝑦 𝑑 𝑦

𝑑𝑦.

!

To enhance tractability, we replace Kőszegi and Rabin’s (2006) reference
lotteries in equations 3.1𝑎 and 3.1𝑏 with their first-moment approximations.
We then demonstrate in Propositions 0a and 0b that the gain-loss preferences
involving this first-moment approximation are still consistent with first- and
second-order stochastic dominance.

For the rest of the analysis, when the

individual chooses the lottery with cdf 𝐹(𝑦), the first moment 𝜇! =

!
𝑦
!!

∗

𝑓 𝑦 𝑑𝑦 will be substituted for the agent’s reference lottery. When 𝑦 is realized,
the agent’s total ex-post utility is now approximated by:
3.2𝑎 𝑈 𝑦 |𝐹 =

𝑦 + 𝜂 𝑦 − 𝜇! 𝑖𝑓 𝑦 > 𝜇!
.
𝑦 + 𝜂𝜆 𝑦 − 𝜇! 𝑖𝑓 𝑦 ≤ 𝜇!

Following Kőszegi and Rabin’s (2006, 2007) concepts of preferred personal
equilibrium (PPE) and choice-acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE), if the
agent chooses lottery 𝐹(⋅), her expected utility is given by:
3.2𝑏 𝐸 𝑈 𝑦 𝐹 = 𝜇! + 𝜂𝜆

!!
!!

𝑦 − 𝜇! 𝑓 𝑦 𝑑𝑦 + 𝜂

!
!!

𝑦 − 𝜇! 𝑓 𝑦 𝑑𝑦.

The differences between the pair of equations (3.2𝑎) and 3.2𝑏 and the pair of
equations 3.1𝑎 and 3.1𝑏 are entirely attributable to differences in the
reference concepts used. Equations (3.1a) and (3.1b) utilize the reference lottery
concept of Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), whereas Equations (3.2𝑎) and
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(3.2𝑏) utilize the reference lottery’s first-moment approximation to enhance
tractability.
Having now established expressions for the agent’s utility for loss-aversion
when the agent’s reference lottery is approximated by its first moment, we will
demonstrate that if 𝐹 first- or second-order stochastically dominates 𝐺, then the
individual’s expected utility under 𝐹 is greater than under 𝐺. These proofs are
important for the paper as our model of sensitization substitutes a first-moment
approximation for the reference lottery. The following proofs will demonstrate
that this approximation is still well-behaved to the extent that consistency with
stochastic dominance is preserved. We start by stating the result for first-order
stochastic dominance in Proposition 0a (see the appendix for the proof) and then
prove the result for second-order stochastic dominance under Proposition 0b.
Proposition 0a. If F and G are two lotteries with supports bounded below and
if F demonstrates strict first-order stochastic dominance over G, then F will be
strictly preferred to G by any agent with preferences characterized Equation
(3.2b) under moderate levels of loss-aversion.12
Proposition 0a states that as long as the sensation of net loss is not too severe,
then loss-averse agents should generally prefer distributions that first-order
stochastically dominate others. Proposition 0a implicitly assumes Kőszegi and
Rabin’s (2007) concept of choice-acclimating personal equilibrium instead of
their (2006) concept of preferred personal equilibrium.13 Because agents in a
choice-acclimating personal equilibrium have greater incentive to deviate to a

12

We require the parameter restriction 𝜂 𝜆 − 1 < 1, which is consistent with both the reference lottery findings of
Masatlioglu and Raymond (2014) as well as the Mean Absolute Semideviation findings of Ogryczak and Ruszczyński
(2001).
13
In a choice-acclimating personal equilibrium, the reference lottery for an off-the-equilibrium-path choice varies with
the choice considered, whereas in a preferred personal equilibrium the reference lottery is fixed by the on-the-equilibriumpath choice.
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first-order stochastically dominated distribution, the sufficient conditions
identified operate across both types of equilibria.14
Proposition 0b states a similar result for second-order stochastic dominance but
does not require the parameter restriction 𝜂 𝜆 − 1 < 1:
Proposition 0b. If F and G are two lotteries with identical means, if F and G
both have bounded supports, and if F second-order stochastically dominates G,
then F will be (weakly) preferred to G by any agent with preferences
characterized by Equation (3.2b).
Proof:

The proof follows directly from property 6.D.2 from Mas-Colell,

Whinston, and Green (1995) that

!
𝐹
!!

𝑦 − 𝐺(𝑦)𝑑𝑦 ≤ 0 for 𝜇! = 𝜇! = 𝜇 and

from Equations (𝐴1) and (𝐴2) in the appendix of this paper.15
Compared to the findings for first-order stochastic dominance, the findings for
second-order stochastic dominance are stronger in that second-order stochastic
dominance does not require any parameter restrictions. Yet, the findings for
second-order stochastic dominance are weaker because they do not guarantee
strict preference.16
4. Sufficient Conditions for Consistency Between Sensitization and
Stochastic Dominance
The preceding section demonstrated consistency between loss-aversion and
first- and second-order stochastic dominance when reference lotteries are
approximated by their first moments. This section will first develop a model of
14

Unlike a preferred personal equilibrium, in a choice-acclimating personal equilibrium, the agent’s deviation to a
dominated distribution lowers the reference point. This lower reference point increases the agent’s utility and gives the
agent greater incentive to deviate to a first-order stochastically dominated distribution.
15
Note that the derivation of these equations does not require first-order stochastic dominance. Instead, these equations
are true for any distribution.
16
To show that strict preference does not hold, note that it is possible to construct two lotteries in which 𝐹 demonstrates
strict second-order stochastic dominance over 𝐺 and have a loss-averse agent indifferent between the two. This unexpected
result stems from the fact that the agent only cares about variation below the mean in Equation (A1). Should 𝐺 represent
an elementary increase in risk from 𝐹 but with 𝐹 𝑦 = 𝐺 𝑦 for all 𝑦 < 𝜇! = 𝜇! , then the agent would be indifferent
between the two lotteries even though 𝐹 demonstrates strict second-order stochastic dominance over 𝐺.
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sensitization and then show that sensitization is also consistent with first- and
second-order stochastic dominance.
4.1 Preferences Capturing Sensitization
This subsection introduces modifications of the preferences in Equation (3.2𝑏)
to capture sensitization. At a broad level, we model sensitization as a learned fear
of loss. In the model, agents who are exposed to frequent losses when young
become overly fixated on the possibility of loss. The subsection concludes by
discussing the implications and justifications for the introduced modeling choices.
To capture the notion that experiences of loss sensitize individuals to fear future
losses and to capture Kandel’s (2001) description of sensitization as “a form of
learned fear” that can operate across stimuli, this paper’s model of sensitization
operates through the frequency of loss experienced during early adulthood.17
Specifically, let 𝑥 represent a comprehensive summary variable representing all
variables relevant for the utility function.

Let 𝐻 𝑥! denote the ex-ante

cumulative density function with mean 𝜇! of this comprehensive summary
variable during period 𝑡. Then 𝐻! (𝜇! ) captures the average frequency of loss that
is realized across all variables in the utility function for an individual young
during period 𝑡. Given 𝐻! (𝜇! ), we say that the individual’s expected utility over
some potentially new variable 𝑦!!! when older during period 𝑡 + 1 will be biased
toward future loss whenever 𝐻! 𝜇! > 0.
individual will be maximally sensitized.

If 𝐻! 𝜇! = 1, we say that the
To capture these preferences more

specifically, assume that if 𝐻! 𝜇! = 0, then the individual remains non-

17

We model sensitization through the frequency and not magnitude of past losses because we model sensitization using
the availability heuristic, which Kahneman (2011) argues operates through biased uses of probabilities. To the extent that a
major traumatic episode triggers frequent sensations of loss, the frequency-based approach may also be consistent with a
magnitude-based approach.
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sensitized and the expected utility associated with lottery 𝐹 is given by Equation
(3.2𝑏).18
𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! |𝐹 = 𝜇! + 𝜂𝜆

!!
!!

!

𝑦!!! − 𝜇! 𝑓 𝑦 𝑑𝑦 + 𝜂

!!

𝑦!!! − 𝜇! 𝑓(𝑦)𝑑𝑦.

We now introduce the availability parameter 𝛼 ∈ [0,1] to capture the relative
degree to which an individual may be sensitized by losses on 𝑥 .

Since

sensitization is generated in our model by the availability heuristic, the degree of
sensitization will depend on the availability of the experienced loss when
contemplating future decisions. 19 𝛼 = 0 corresponds to an individual who is
either immune to sensitization or whose losses experienced on 𝑥 during period 𝑡
are not available when considering potentials gains and losses on 𝑦 during period
𝑡 + 1 . 𝛼 = 1 corresponds to an individual who is maximally susceptible to
sensitization and whose losses on 𝑥 experienced during period 𝑡 were maximally
available when considering potential gains and losses on 𝑦 during period 𝑡 + 1.
When 𝐻! 𝜇! = 1, the individual will be maximally sensitized given her 𝛼 and
will have preferences given by:
!

𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! |𝐹 = 𝜇! + 𝜂 1 − 𝛼
!!

+ 𝜂𝜆 1 + 𝛼

!!

!!

𝑦!!! − 𝜇! 𝑓 𝑦 𝑑𝑦

𝑦!!! − 𝜇! 𝑓 𝑦 𝑑𝑦.

For more intermediate levels of 𝐻! 𝜇! , the degree of sensitization is
proportional to the frequency of loss when young:

18
19

With lottery 𝐹 having cumulative density function 𝐹 𝑦!!! and mean 𝜇! .
Kahneman (2011) argues that emotional charge, vividness, and ease of recall are primary determinants of availability.
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4.1 𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! |𝐹
!

= 𝜇! + 𝜂 1 − 𝛼𝐻! 𝜇!
+ 𝜂𝜆 1 + 𝛼𝐻! 𝜇!

!!
!!

!!

𝑦!!! − 𝜇! 𝑓 𝑦 𝑑𝑦

𝑦!!! − 𝜇! 𝑓 𝑦 𝑑𝑦.

Equation (4.1) comprehensively captures the preferences of sensitization for a
given lottery 𝐹, and the chosen specification of sensitization demonstrates six
implicit properties worth discussing. We first explicitly introduce the four new
properties of focus-shifting, Bayesian non-updatability, boundedness, and
monotonicity before expanding upon the two previously-discussed properties of
being availability-driven and extraordinarily persistent.20
First, sensitization is said to be focus-shifting. In this model of sensitization,
past experiences of loss cause an individual to focus her attention away from
expected gains to expected losses. Although one could model past experiences of
loss as lowering the reference points, this would serve to increase the agent’s
utility and therefore does not seem realistic.

One could also assume that

sensitization primarily operates by distorting the first term in Equation (4.1), “the
consumption utility component” or the component of the agent’s expected utility
that is independent of gains and losses. Yet, it would no longer be clear how
sensitization would be able to operate across stimuli in the absence of
informational content if sensitization operated by distorting the agent’s
consumption utility.
There are two further advantages of modeling sensitization’s availability biases
as a shift in focus instead of a bias in probability as discussed by Kahneman
(2011). One advantage is that it leads to our second discussion-worthy property
20

A seventh but less important property stems from the choice to model sensitization as an equal shift in focus from gains
to losses. As a result, Equation (4.1) utilizes the same α across both gain and loss terms in the utility function, but this is
not necessary as the parameter restrictions used in the next subsection’s proofs could easily be altered to address
asymmetry in 𝛼.
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of Bayesian non-updatability, and this property allows for sensitization and
rational expectations to easily coexist within a boundedly-rational model. In the
model, agents’ rational expectations inform both consumption utility and the
reference points, but these expectations prove insufficient to update the irrational
fixation or focus on loss. Therefore, sensitization’s shift in focus is not able to be
updated in a Bayesian manner. In contrast, if sensitization were interpreted to
operate through biased likelihoods, then agents should be able to replace their
biased likelihoods with their rationally-calculated ones, precluding sensitization
from affecting preferences. Another advantage is that this paper’s approach as a
shift in focus requires fewer ad hoc assumptions to demonstrate consistency with
first- and second-order stochastic dominance.
As a third discussion-worthy property, the degree of sensitization is said to be
bounded. When 𝛼 < 1, the individual will never completely ignore the potential
for gains. Only if 𝛼𝐻! 𝜇! = 1 would the individual completely shift her focus
from gains to losses, and the restriction that 𝛼 ∈ [0,1] precludes the individual
from shifting the focus even further. Furthermore, the non-negativity of 𝛼 implies
that focus can be shifted to losses but not to gains, which is consistent with an
asymmetrical model of sensitization based on a learned fear of loss.
Fourth, these preferences are monotonically increasing.

Individuals who

experienced losses more frequently are predicted to exhibit a greater distorted
focus toward loss. This monotonicity property may explain why persistent shocks
generating frequent experiences of loss (e.g., the Great Depression) have larger
long-run impacts on future risk preferences than one-time shocks generating
negligible losses (e.g., seeing a favorite character suffer an adverse shock in a
scary movie).
Fifth, sensitization is said to be availability-driven because sensitization
operates through the availability parameter 𝛼, and the presence of this parameter
differentiates sensitization from adaptive loss-aversion. 𝛼 governs the degree to
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which experiences of losses in one dimension of utility sensitize decision-making
in other dimensions. Losses that are more available are consistent with a larger 𝛼,
whereas less available losses are consistent with a smaller 𝛼. Since Kahneman
(2011) argues that salience affects availability, this specification predicts that noneconomic shocks are less likely to sensitize future economic decision-making.
This prediction helps differentiate our model from a more general model of
adaptive loss-aversion, in which non-economic shocks would be equally likely to
sensitize future economic decision-making.
Sixth, and as previously emphasized, the shifts in risk preferences resulting
from first-time shocks during young adulthood are predicted to be extraordinarily
persistent. This persistence is due to the presence of the availability parameter 𝛼.
Because memories of first-time experiences have been shown to be easily
recalled, vivid, and emotionally charged decades later, the persistence of these
availability factors for memories of first-time experiences during young adulthood
predicts that memories of these experiences will generate decades-long distortions
in risk and loss attitudes.
4.2 Sensitization and Stochastic Dominance
This subsection will demonstrate that the sensitization preferences specified by
Equation (4.1) will be consistent with first- and second-order stochastic
dominance under the stricter sufficient condition that 𝜂𝜆 < 1/2.21 As before, let
𝐻 𝑥! denote the ex-ante cumulative density function of 𝑥 at time 𝑡 and suppose
that the agent can choose between lotteries 𝐹 and 𝐺 over some variable 𝑦 at time
𝑡 + 1.

Suppose further that these lotteries 𝐹 and 𝐺 have cumulative density

functions given by 𝐹 𝑦!!! and 𝐺(𝑦!!! ), respectively. Finally, suppose that the
21

Instead of the looser sufficient condition η λ − 1 < 1 required for consistency between loss-aversion and stochastic
dominance in the previous subsection. If losses have twice the magnitude of gains so that λ = 2, this stricter restriction
requires η < 1/4. That is, the weight of the gain-loss utility component must be less than a quarter of the weight of the
standard consumption utility component.
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probability density functions of these three lotteries are given by ℎ 𝑥! , 𝑓 𝑦!!! ,
and 𝑔(𝑦!!! ) , in which the probability density function corresponds to the
cumulative density function of the same letter. Given experienced frequency of
loss 𝐻(𝜇! ) at time 𝑡 during the agent’s young adulthood, Equation (4.1) denotes
the agent’s expected utility under lottery 𝐹 , and Equation (4.2) below will
represent the agent’s expected utility under lottery 𝐺:
4.2 𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! |𝐺
!

= 𝜇! + 𝜂 1 − 𝛼𝐻! 𝜇!
+ 𝜂𝜆 1 + 𝛼𝐻! 𝜇!

!!
!!

!!

𝑦!!! − 𝜇! 𝑔 𝑦 𝑑𝑦

𝑦!!! − 𝜇! 𝑔(𝑦)𝑑𝑦.

Given Equations (4.1) and (4.2), we wish to show that 𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! |𝐹
𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! |𝐺

≥

whenever 𝐹 first- or second-order stochastically dominates 𝐺 .

Proposition 1a is stated immediately below and the proof is provided in the
appendix.
Proposition 1a. If F and G are two lotteries with supports bounded below and
if F demonstrates strict first-order stochastic dominance over G, then F will be
strictly preferred to G by any agent sensitized according to Equation (4.1) under
moderate levels of loss-aversion.22
The sufficient condition identified in Proposition 1a relating to sensitization
requires stricter restrictions for the parameters 𝜂, 𝜆 than used in the proof of
Proposition 0a without sensitization. However, unlike Proposition 0a, Proposition
1a does not require loss-aversion

𝜆 > 1 to guarantee strict preference of the

strictly dominant lottery. Even loss-neutral but sensitized agents will strictly
prefer the strictly dominant lottery. In addition, the proof assumes extreme levels
22

As mentioned, it is sufficient for the proof that both 𝜂 and 𝜆 are bounded such that 𝜂𝜆 < 1/2. This restriction is slightly
stricter than the earlier sufficient condition 𝜂(𝜆 − 1) < 1 used for Proposition 0a.
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of sensitization, 𝛼 = 1. Under less extreme levels of sensitization than 𝛼 = 1,
one could derive weaker restrictions.
In contrast to the results of first-order stochastic dominance, the sufficient
conditions for second-order stochastic dominance do not require additional
restrictions on the parameters 𝜂, 𝜆. Yet as before, the results for second-order
stochastic dominance in Proposition 1b do not guarantee that an agent will strictly
prefer the strictly dominant distribution. Following Mas-Colell, Whinston, and
Green (1995), we assume that the two distributions have identical means.
Proposition 1b is listed below and its proof stems directly from the property of
second-order stochastic dominance that

!
𝐹
!!

𝑦 − 𝐺(𝑦)𝑑𝑦 ≤ 0 for 𝜇 = 𝜇! =

𝜇! and from Equation (𝐴6) in the Appendix.23
Proposition 1b. If F and G are two lotteries having bounded supports and
identical means and if F second-order stochastically dominates G, then F will be
(weakly) preferred to G by any agent sensitized according to Equation (4.1).
5. Financial Model with and without Sensitization
Having established properties of sensitization in a general setting, this section
proceeds to study sensitization’s macroeconomic consequences. This section first
develops an overlapping-generations version of Tirole’s (2006) liquidity-scale
framework when agents are loss-neutral and non-sensitized. This section then
develops a model with sensitization to study the comparative statics of
sensitization from a positive but not normative perspective.24
5.1 Non-sensitized Financial Model under Loss-Neutrality
This section studies how sensitization affects risk choices and key
macroeconomic variables, such as liquidity ratios and investment, through
23
24

Note that Equation (𝐴6) is true for any two distributions and does not require first-order stochastic dominance to derive.

The analysis of investment and liquidity distortions is positive but not normative. The analysis does not explicitly
identify inefficiencies for policymakers to address because agents in our model are still maximizing loss-adjusted returns.
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generational shifts in risk preferences. Since we could not find a suitable model
in the existing literature to serve as a comprehensive benchmark, the benchmark
model combines elements from the models of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Tirole
(2006), and Romer (1986). We refer to this benchmark as the non-sensitized
benchmark because agents are assumed to be loss-neutral and immune to
sensitization with 𝜆 = 1 and 𝛼 = 0.
Like all of the models considered in this section, this benchmark is a partial
equilibrium analysis of a financial sector populated by financial entrepreneurs.
Although an external household sector and external production sector are both
present, the details determining equilibria in these two sectors are exogenous to
the model as presented in this paper. In this paper, households simply provide
funds to financial agents with a given upwardly-sloped savings function 𝑆 𝑅 .
For tractability, we assume a Romer (1986) production function in which the
return on capital is fixed, and we further assume perfect capital depreciation
within each period.

Consequently, firms buy units of capital from financial

entrepreneurs with time-invariant price 𝑞 equal to a time-invariant marginal
product of capital.
A timeline of events in the benchmark model is given below. The events
identified in the timeline will be discussed in-depth later in this section.
1.

A unit mass of entrepreneurs of generation 𝑡 arrives.

2.

The investment projects of generation 𝑡 − 1 are realized and
aggregate capital 𝐾! is formed.

3.

Each unit of capital 𝐾! is bought at price 𝑞. Entrepreneurs of
generation 𝑡 − 1 consume 𝑐!! before expiring.

4.

Production occurs with households and entrepreneurs inelastically
providing one unit of labor for wage 𝑤! .
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5.

Households offer upward-sloping savings schedule 𝑆(𝑅! ) to
financial entrepreneurs.

6.

Of the total funds 𝑖! available for investment, the entrepreneur
allocates fraction 𝑙! toward liquid assets and invests the remaining
funds 1 − 𝑙! ∗ 𝑖! in the investment project.

7.

An idiosyncratic cost overrun 𝜌! is realized. The cost overrun is
paid if 𝑙! ≥ 𝜌! and the project is said to be successful. Following
success, the entrepreneur will have capital next period 𝑘!!! =
𝜅! 1 − 𝑙! 𝑖! . When 𝑙! < 𝜌! , the cost overrun cannot be paid and
the project is said to fail. Following failure, the entrepreneur will
have capital 𝑘!!! = 𝜅! 1 − 𝑙! 𝑖! next period.

Given the unit

mass of entrepreneurs, 𝐾!!! = 𝑘!!! .
As indicated in the timeline, the role of financial entrepreneurs is to convert
savings into physical capital. Like Bernanke and Gertler (1989), these financial
entrepreneurs manage their investment projects.25 Entrepreneurs borrow amount
𝑏! from households and pay rate of interest 𝑅! . This borrowing is assumed to take
the form of bonds with 𝑅! independent of the investment project’s realization.
To generate capital for the economy, entrepreneurs devote their entire wage
income (𝑤! ) to savings and combine their savings with money borrowed from
households 𝑏! to generate 𝑘!!! units of capital. Because they are assumed to
!
not consume during their period of entry, their consumption next period 𝑐!!!
is

given by:
!
𝑐!!!
= 𝑞𝑘!!! − 𝑅! 𝑏! .

25

Unlike Bernanke and Gertler, this paper uses a partial equilibrium analysis for enhanced tractability.
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To study how sensitization affects risk choices, investment projects will have
the characteristics described by Tirole (2006, p. 209-210). Central to his model is
a tradeoff between liquidity and scale.

For simplification, he assumes that

investment projects are identical across each generation’s representative
entrepreneur and that they exhibit constant returns to scale. In both Tirole’s
model and ours, risk stems from the presence of liquidity shocks. These shocks
take the form of a potential cost overrun, so that entrepreneurs’ initial investment
outlay may require a further cash injection 𝜌! to successfully bring the project to
completion.26
In order to manage the risk of a cost overrun, entrepreneurs will need to arrange
for access to liquid assets. If we think of the lending 𝑤! by the entrepreneur to the
project as junior debt and the external borrowing 𝑏! as senior debt, then we can
think of the choice of liquidity as being captured a liquidity ratio 𝑙! ∈ 0,1 ,
defined as the amount of liquid assets as a percentage of total liabilities. Because
𝑖! = 𝑤! + 𝑏! measures both total liabilities and the size of the investment project,
the liquidity ratio also represents the fraction of the project’s funding that is
allocated toward liquid assets. The remaining fraction, (1 − 𝑙! ) will be allocated
toward the (illiquid) initial investment outlay, 1 − 𝑙! ∗ 𝑤! + 𝑏! .
When a cost overrun occurs, there are two possible outcomes depending on the
liquidity ratio previously secured by the entrepreneur.

If that generation’s

representative entrepreneur (she) has sufficient liquid assets and pays the cost
overrun, then the project is said to be successful and 𝑘!!! = 𝜅! ∗ 1 − 𝑙! ∗ 𝑖!
units of capital are generated next period. If she does not pay the cost overrun,
then the project is said to be unsuccessful and only 𝑘!!! = 𝜅! ∗ 1 − 𝑙! ∗ 𝑖! units
of capital are generated, with both Δ𝜅 = 𝜅! − 𝜅! and 𝜅! positive. Like Tirole
26

These cost overruns may be due to a variety of sources: design flaws, strategic behavior by a contracted party seeking to
renegotiate the contracted terms, or from the inability to secure a key input.
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(2006), the supply of liquid assets is perfectly elastic with the return to liquid
assets normalized to zero. 27

Additionally, these assumptions imply that

entrepreneurs will pay the cost overrun when able and allow us to focus on the
entrepreneur’s ex-ante liquidity choice, this section’s main concern.
Similarly to Tirole’s model, the properties of cost overruns are as follows.
First, the size of the cost overrun is proportional to the amount of funding
acquired by the entrepreneur, 𝑖! . Second, the magnitude of the shock 𝜌! ∈ [0,1]
has probability density function 𝑓(𝜌! ) and cumulative density function 𝐹(𝜌! ).
Third, liquidity arrangements must be made prior to the shock’s realization.
Finally, entrepreneurs must pay all cost overruns from their liquid assets.28
Together, the amount of liquidity available and the size of the cost overrun (or
liquidity shock) determine the project’s outcome. If the liquidity ratio is at least
as large as the realized shock, 𝑙! ≥ 𝜌! , the project is successful. This outcome
occurs with probability 𝐹(𝑙! ). Otherwise when 𝑙! < 𝜌! , the project fails. Failure
occurs with probability 1 − 𝐹 𝑙! .
Risk-neutral entrepreneurs use liquidity to maximize their expected net returns.
These returns depend on the price of capital, the expected quantity of capital
produced, and borrowing costs:
! !(!! )

(5.1)

𝑞

1 − 𝑙! 𝜅! F 𝑙! + 𝜅! 1 − F 𝑙!

!"#$% !" !"#$%"&

−

!!

∗ 𝑤! + 𝑏!

! !!!! !!"#!$%!& !"#$% !" !"#$%"& !"#"$%&"'

𝑅! 𝑏! .
!"##"$%&' !"#$#
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Note that in the absence of potential cost overruns, the equilibrium demand for liquidity would be zero.

For tractability, we assume that credit sharing is not possible. In this paper, liquidity can be considered a reduced-form
variable that captures all contingency-planning resources spent by the financial entrepreneur.
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The first-order conditions for liquidity and borrowing, respectively, are given
by:
5.2
5.3

𝑓 𝑙!∗ 1 − 𝑙!∗ Δ𝜅 − E 𝜅 ∗ = 0,
𝑞 1 − 𝑙!∗ E 𝜅 ∗ = 𝑅! ,

in which 𝐸 𝜅(𝑙! ) represents the expected units of capital generated per unit of
investment and 𝐸 𝜅 ∗ represents its expected level when 𝑙! coincides with its
optimal level 𝑙!∗ .
Equation (5.2) characterizes the demand for liquidity in the economy and
describes the tradeoffs faced by entrepreneurs when choosing liquidity. The first
term captures how an increase in liquidity results in a higher likelihood of a
successful outcome, but the second term captures how an increase in liquidity
causes the scale of investment to fall. This tradeoff is captured in Figure 1. The
slope of the marginal benefit curve is given by 𝑓! 𝑙!∗ 1 − 𝑙!∗ Δ𝜅 − 𝑓 𝑙!∗ Δ𝜅, and is
guaranteed to be negative as long as 𝑓! ≤ 0.29 The slope of the marginal cost
curve is given by 𝑓 𝑙!∗ Δ𝜅, which is clearly positive as illustrated in Figure 1.
[ Insert Figure 1 Here]
Equation (5.3) characterizes demand for borrowing in this economy.
Entrepreneurs are assumed to be price-takers with regard to both the price of
capital and the interest rate for borrowing. Since their projects exhibit constant
returns to scale, they make zero economic profit and their demand for borrowing
is perfectly elastic. 30 As an illustration of how Equation (5.3) determines
equilibrium investment, Figure 2 illustrates how the equilibrium investment
changes when investors become less willing to borrow due to a reduced collective
tolerance to bear losses.
29

This assumption will turn out to be a sufficient second-order condition for this benchmark model, and is analogous to
assuming that 𝐹 𝑙! is concave.
30
To verify this perfect elasticity, note that if households were to demand interest rate 𝑅! > 𝑞 1 − 𝑙!∗ 𝐸[𝜅 ∗ ], entrepreneurs
would not borrow. If households were to accept interest rate 𝑅! < 𝑞 1 − 𝑙!∗ 𝐸[𝜅 ∗ ], entrepreneurs would be willing to
undertake investment projects of infinite scale.

30

The second-order condition for liquidity is:
5.4

𝑓! Δ𝜅 1 − 𝑙! − 2 ∗ 𝑓 𝑙! Δ𝜅 < 0.

Note that if 𝑓! ≤ 0, then condition (5.4) is always satisfied. This assumption
implies that the probability of a given shock is monotonically decreasing in its
magnitude and that the cumulative density function 𝐹(𝜌! ) is concave in 𝜌! . The
rest of this section will employ this assumption to ensure that the system is wellbehaved.
Finally, assume that following unsuccessful outcomes, entrepreneurs have
sufficient income to pay back their loans.31
𝜅! 𝑤! + 𝑏! ≥ 𝐸 𝜅 ∗ ∗ 𝑏! .

5.5

Assumption (5.5) guarantees that even following a most extreme cost overrun,
entrepreneurs have sufficient income to pay off debts, allowing us to study
sensitization without introducing credit constraints or similar credit frictions.32
Satisfying equation (5.5) will require a minimum restriction on 𝑤! relative to 𝑏!
but will allow us to demonstrate that sensitization is able to generate procyclical
investment even in the absence of credit frictions.33
5.2 Model with Sensitization and Loss-Aversion
In this subsection, we augment the model from the last subsection to include
sensitization and loss-aversion in order to study sensitization’s macroeconomic
consequences. Under the gain-loss preferences of Kőszegi and Rabin (2006,
2007), an agent experiences a gain whenever 𝜅! is realized because the cost
overrun is smaller than planned with 𝜌! < 𝑙! .

31
32

Gains therefore occur with

Condition (5.5) guarantees that 𝑞𝜅! 1 − 𝑙!∗ 𝑤! + 𝑏! ≥ 𝑅! 𝑏! and is derived using Equation 5.3 .

As demonstrated by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), the inclusion of these additional concerns would only serve to make
investment even more procyclical.
33
!!
Note that the restriction 𝑤! ≥ 𝑏! is sufficient for all distributions 𝐹(𝑙! ).
!!

31

1 − 𝑙! 𝑤! + 𝑏! . 34

probability 𝐹(𝑙! ) and have magnitude 𝜂𝑞 𝜅! − 𝐸 𝜅(𝑙! )

Likewise, losses occur with probability 1 − 𝐹 𝑙! , and losses are triggered
when the cost overrun is higher than expected.
magnitude of the loss is given by 𝜂𝜆𝑞 𝜅! − 𝐸 𝜅 𝑙!

When 𝜅! is realized, the
(1 − 𝑙! )(𝑤! + 𝑏! ).

Our model of sensitization assumes that past experiences of loss distort the
agent’s focus from gains to losses. This specification requires that the degree of
distortion is proportional to the agent’s past experience of loss, 1 − 𝐹 𝑙!!! .
Incorporating the effects of sensitization, her expected utility is therefore:
𝐸 𝑈 𝑙! , 𝑏!
= 𝑞 1 − 𝑙! 𝐸 𝜅 𝑙!
+ 𝜂𝜆

𝑤! + 𝑏! − 𝑅! 𝑏!

1 + 𝛼 1 − 𝐹 𝑙!!!

∗ 1 − 𝐹 𝑙!

𝑞 𝜅! − 𝐸 𝜅

!"#$%&'() !" !"##

!""#$% !" !"#!$%$&'%$(# !" !"## !"#$. !" !"##

+𝜂

1 − 𝛼 1 − 𝐹 𝑙!!!

∗ 𝐹 𝑙! ∗ 𝑞
!"#$.
!" !!"#
!""#$% !" !"#!$%$&'%$(# !" !"#$

1 − 𝑙! 𝑤! + 𝑏!

𝜅! − 𝐸 𝜅

1 − 𝑙! 𝑤!
!"#$%&'() !" !"#$

+ 𝑏! .

This expected utility simplifies to:
5.6

𝐸 𝑈 𝑙! , 𝑏!
= 𝑞 1 − 𝑙! 𝐸 𝜅 𝑙!
∗

𝜆−1
!"##!!"#$%&'(

𝑤! + 𝑏! − 𝑅! 𝑏! − 𝜂

+ 2𝛼 1 − 𝐹 𝑙!!!

+ 𝜆 − 1 𝛼 1 − 𝐹 𝑙!!!

!"#!$%$&'%$(#

!"#$%!"#$%& !"#$

∗ 𝑞𝐹 𝑙! 1 − 𝐹 𝑙! Δ𝜅 1 − 𝑙! 𝑤! + 𝑏! .
If the entrepreneur chooses 𝑏! and 𝑙! optimally, this leads to first-order
conditions:
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The gain and loss probabilities of this section differ from the gain and loss probabilities from sections 3 and 4 because
the risky lotteries of sections 3 and 4 assumed output but not cost uncertainty. As a result, in Sections 3 and 4 gains were
realized whenever 𝑦 was higher than expected. In this section, gains are realized whenever costs are lower than expected,
and 𝐹 𝑙! now refers to the probability of gain.
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5.7

𝑅! = 𝑞 1 − 𝑙! 𝐸 𝜅 𝑙!
∗

5.8

− 𝜂𝑞𝐹 𝑙!

𝜆 − 1 + 2𝛼 1 − 𝐹 𝑙!!!

1 − 𝐹 𝑙!

Δ𝜅 1 − 𝑙!

+ 𝜆 − 1 𝛼 1 − 𝐹 𝑙!!!

,

𝑓 𝑙! 1 − 𝑙! Δ𝜅 − 𝐸 𝜅 𝑙!
− 𝜂 𝜆 − 1 + 2𝛼 1 − 𝐹 𝑙!!!
∗ Δ𝜅

1 − 2𝐹 𝑙!

+ 𝜆 − 1 𝛼 1 − 𝐹 𝑙!!!

1 − 𝑙! 𝑓 𝑙! − 𝐹 𝑙!

1 − 𝐹 𝑙!

= 0,

in which 𝑙! represents the second-best liquidity ratio under sensitization and lossaversion. If 𝛼 = 0 and 𝜆 = 1, these two equations coincide with Equations 5.2
and 5.3 . For more general 𝛼 and 𝜆, Equation (5.7) is a standard (loss-adjusted)
zero-profit condition that stems from the simplifying assumption that projects
enjoy constant marginal returns in 𝑤! + 𝑏! . 35 Equation 5.8 represents a
standard first-order condition in which there is a tradeoff between liquidity and
scale. An increase in liquidity 𝑙! increases the likelihood that the project will
succeed by 𝑓(𝑙! ) but reduces the scale of the project by 𝐸 𝜅 𝑙! . Moreover,
increasing 𝑙! will affect the magnitude of loss, which depends on the term
𝐹 𝑙! 1 − 𝐹 𝑙!

1 − 𝑙! .

Since the magnitude of 𝐹 𝑙! 1 − 𝐹 𝑙!

1 − 𝑙! is

minimized by 𝑙! ∈ 0,1 , the availability and loss-aversion parameters will
introduce a tendency toward corner solutions and may result in multiple equilibria
in the absence of parameter restrictions forcing a unique interior solution.
For a unique maximum to exist, a sufficient second-order condition is:

35

This paper’s use of the term loss-adjusted profit incorporates both sensitization and loss-aversion, as well as the
interaction between the two.
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5.9

𝑓! 𝑙! ∗ 1 − 𝑙! − 2𝑓 𝑙!
− 𝜂 𝜆 − 1 + 2𝛼 1 − 𝐹 𝑙!!!
∗ 𝑓! 𝑙!

1 − 2𝐹 𝑙!

− 2𝑓 𝑙!

1 − 2𝐹 𝑙!

+ 𝜆 − 1 𝛼 1 − 𝐹 𝑙!!!

1 − 𝑙! − 2 1 − 𝑙! 𝑓 𝑙!

!

< 0.

To guarantee a unique 𝑙! to the problem, it is sufficient for the following
expression to be negative:
𝑓! 𝑙! ∗ 1 − 𝑙! ∗ 1 − 𝜂 𝜆 − 1 + 2𝛼 + 𝜆 − 1 𝛼
− 2𝑓 𝑙!

1 − 𝜂 𝜆 − 1 + 2𝛼 + 𝜆 − 1 𝛼 ∗ 1 + 𝑓 𝑙!

< 0.

Since 𝑓! < 0 by assumption, then Expression 5.9 is clearly satisfied as long as
the loss term 𝜂 𝜆 − 1 + 2𝛼 + 𝜆 − 1 𝛼 is relatively small and 𝑓 0 is not too
large as captured by the following restriction:
5.10

𝜂 𝜆 − 1 + 2𝛼 + 𝜆 − 1 𝛼 <

1
.
1+𝑓 0

Because 𝑓 0 > 0, Restriction (5.10) is stricter than the restriction 𝜂𝜆 < 1/2
previously introduced for Proposition 1𝑎. To preclude the possibility of multiple
equilibria, the rest of the paper will maintain the stricter Restriction (5.10).
Having discussed the first- and second-order conditions for the entrepreneur’s
liquidity-scale tradeoff, we now conduct comparative statics to determine the
cyclicality of investment and liquidity ratios under sensitization. Starting with
investment and interest rate 𝑅! , let Λ! = 𝜂 𝜆 − 1 + 2𝛼 1 − 𝐹 𝑙!!!
𝜆 − 1 𝛼 1 − 𝐹 𝑙!!!

+

represent a comprehensive term of the agent’s sensation

of net loss, which captures loss-aversion, sensitization, and their interaction.
Clearly, Λ! is increasing in loss-aversion (𝜆 − 1), the availability parameter 𝛼,
and the realized frequency of loss when young 1 − 𝐹 𝑙!!! . Equation (5.11)
follows from the Envelope Condition and Equation 5.7 :
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5.11

𝑑𝑅!
= −𝑞𝐹 𝑙!
𝑑Λ!

1 − 𝐹 𝑙!

Δ𝜅 1 − 𝑙! < 0.

Equation (5.11) implies that entrepreneurs will require a larger loss-premium
when faced with a larger loss term Λ! , and that this loss-premium will reduce the
interest rate they offer to households. If the saving curve is upward-sloping, then
households will reduce their quantity of savings.

In a closed economy, the

investment-savings identity will require that the equilibrium quantity of
investment must also fall. These insights are captured by Proposition 2:
Proposition 2.

If 𝑆 ! 𝑅! > 0, then increases in loss-aversion (𝜆 − 1), the

availability of losses 𝛼 , or realized loss when young 1 − 𝐹 𝑙!!!

reduce the

quantity of investment in a closed economy by leading financial entrepreneurs to
offer lower interest rates 𝑅! to households. Furthermore,

!!!
! !!! !!!!

<0

suggests that investment is procyclical but that loss premia caused by Λ are
countercyclical, with increased realizations of loss leading to decreases in
investment but increases in Λ! .
Proposition 2 states that the availability parameter 𝛼 responsible for
sensitization reinforces the distortions in investment caused by loss-aversion and
that both sensitization and loss-aversion act to reduce investment by increasing
loss-premia. Proposition 2 also suggests that the dynamics of loss premia are
countercyclical but that the dynamics of investment are procyclical because
realized losses rise during recessions, causing Λ! to increase and the quantity of
investment to fall. A graphical representation of Proposition 2 is presented in
Figure 2. The zero-profit condition of Equation (5.7) implies that investment is
perfectly elastic in 𝑅! . In Figure 2, an increase in Λ from Λ! to Λ! ′ following an
increase in 1 − 𝐹 𝑙!!!
!!!
!!!

will cause the investment schedule to shift down as

< 0. As long as the savings function is upward-sloping, an increase in the
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loss premium Λ! will result in a decrease in the economy’s equilibrium level of
investment as shown in Figure 2.
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
Relative to its effects on 𝑅! , the effects of an increase in Λ! on 𝑙! are more
ambiguous.

From Equation (5.6), the agent’s sensation of net loss depends

positively on 1 − 𝑙! 𝐹 𝑙! 1 − 𝐹 𝑙! , which is minimized for 𝑙! ∈ {0,1}. From
Equation (5.8),
𝑑𝑙!
𝑑Λ!

5.12

1 − 2𝐹 𝑙!

= Δ𝜅
1 − 𝑙!

𝑓! 𝑙!

1 − 𝑙! 𝑓 𝑙! − 𝐹 𝑙!

2𝑓 𝑙!
−
− Λ! 1 − 2𝐹 𝑙!
1 − 𝑙!

1 − 𝐹 𝑙!
!

𝑓! 𝑙!

2𝑓 𝑙!
2𝑓 𝑙!
−
−
1 − 2𝐹 𝑙!
1 − 𝑙!

with the denominator less than zero when Restriction (5.10) holds and the
numerator equal to the slope of 1 − 𝑙! 𝐹 𝑙! 1 − 𝐹 𝑙! . If the liquidity ratio 𝑙 ∗
from Equation (5.2) exceeds the liquidity ratio maximizing 𝐹 𝑙 1 − 𝐹 𝑙 (1 −
𝑙), then Λ! > 0 will encourage the agent to reduce the sensation of net loss by
increasing the liquidity ratio. If the liquidity ratio 𝑙 ∗ from Equation (5.2) is below
the liquidity ratio maximizing 𝐹 𝑙 1 − 𝐹 𝑙 (1 − 𝑙), then Λ! > 0 will encourage
the agent to reduce the sensation of net loss Λ! by decreasing the liquidity ratio.
The following proposition captures the economic intuition behind Equation
5.12 :
Proposition 3. Increases in loss-aversion 𝜆 − 1 , the availability of loss 𝛼 ,
or realized loss when young 1 − 𝐹 𝑙!!!

distort the liquidity ratio from its first-

best level toward extreme values, 𝑙! ∈ 0,1 . If loss is relatively unlikely with
𝐹 𝑙! ≈ 1, then increases in loss-aversion, the availability of loss, and past
experience of loss will increase the agent’s liquidity ratio. If loss is relatively
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,

likely with 𝐹 𝑙! ≈ 0, then increases in loss-aversion, the availability of loss, and
past experience of loss will decrease the agent’s liquidity ratio.
Proposition 3 suggests that distortions in liquidity ratios are countercyclical but
that liquidity ratios may be either countercyclical or procyclical. Although this
ambiguous theoretical finding contrasts with Kato’s (2006) empirical finding of
countercyclical liquidity ratios, to the extent that the probabilities of loss are
generally low in a normal economy, Proposition 3 would suggest that liquidity
ratios should be countercyclical.
6. Concluding Comments
In this paper, we developed preferences consistent with long-run sensitization
based on our understanding of Kandel’s (2001) discussion of sensitization,
Kahneman’s (2011) discussion of the availability heuristic, and our understanding
of the psychological phenomenon of extraordinary persistence of first-time
memories from young adulthood referred to as the reminiscence bump. We
believe that this paper’s model of long-run sensitization may explain the long-run
changes in risk preferences documented in the empirical literature, with past
experiences of loss increasing the loss-premium required by agents in the model.
To show that these preferences are well-behaved, sensitization is shown to
preserve consistency with stochastic dominance.
One of the limitations of the model of sensitization is that sensitization, like
loss-aversion, may induce agents to prefer corner solutions.

In addition,

sensitization’s effects at the intensive margin (e.g., liquidity) may be
indeterminate and depend on the probability of loss. When loss is relatively
unlikely, increases in sensitization and loss-aversion induce the agent to decrease
her overall sensation of net loss by increasing liquidity. When loss is relatively
likely, increases in sensitization and loss-aversion induce the agent to decrease her
overall sensation of net loss by decreasing liquidity.
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In conclusion, we note that the results for loss-aversion and sensitization starkly
contrast with conventional models of risk-aversion. Conventional models of riskaversion suggest that increases in risk-aversion reduce risk-taking on both the
extensive and intensive margins. In contrast, this paper finds that increases in
loss-aversion (as well as sensitization) reduce risk-taking on the extensive margin
but may increase risk-taking on the intensive margin when the probability of loss
is high. We believe that our findings suggest the need for further research to
better understand the macroeconomic consequences of sensitization and lossaversion.
Appendix: Proofs Related to First-Order Stochastic Dominance
Proof of Proposition 0a:
Suppose that lottery 𝐹 exhibits strict first-order stochastic dominance over 𝐺.
We wish to show that the expected utility of 𝐹, denoted 𝐸 𝑈 𝑦 𝐹 , will exceed
the expected utility of 𝐺. From Equation (3.2𝑏), the expected utility for lottery 𝐹
is:
!!

𝐸 𝑈 𝑦 𝐹 = 𝜇! + 𝜂𝜆
Adding and subtracting 𝜂

!!
!!
!!

𝐸 𝑈 𝑦 𝐹 = 𝜇! + 𝜂𝜆

!

𝑦 − 𝜇! 𝑓 𝑦 𝑑𝑦 + 𝜂

!!

𝑦 − 𝜇! 𝑓 𝑦 𝑑𝑦.

𝑦 − 𝜇! 𝑓 𝑦 𝑑𝑦 to the right-hand side yields:

!!
!!

𝑦 − 𝜇! 𝑓 𝑦 𝑑𝑦 − 𝜂

!!
!!

𝑦 − 𝜇! 𝑓 𝑦 𝑑𝑦

!

+𝜂
!!

Since

!
!!

𝑦 − 𝜇! 𝑓 𝑦 𝑑𝑦.

𝑦 − 𝜇! 𝑓 𝑦 𝑑𝑦 = 0, the above expression simplifies to:
𝐸 𝑈 𝑦 𝐹 = 𝜇! + 𝜂 𝜆 − 1

!!
!!

𝑦 − 𝜇! 𝑓 𝑦 𝑑𝑦.

Integration by parts yields:
𝐸 𝑈 𝑦 𝐹 = 𝜇! + 𝜂 𝜆 − 1 ∗ (𝑦 − 𝜇! ) ∗ 𝐹(𝑦)
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!!
!!

−

!!
!!

𝐹 𝑦 𝑑𝑦 .

Since 𝐹’s support is bounded below, lim!→!! 𝑦 ∗ 𝐹 𝑦 = 0, and the above
expression simplifies to:
𝐴1

𝐸 𝑈 𝑦 𝐹 = 𝜇! − 𝜂 𝜆 − 1 ∗

!!

𝐹 𝑦 𝑑𝑦.

!!

We use the same reasoning to obtain the analogous expression for the expected
utility associated with choosing lottery 𝐺:
𝐴2

𝐸 𝑈 𝑦 𝐺 = 𝜇! − 𝜂 𝜆 − 1 ∗

!!

𝐺 𝑦 𝑑𝑦.

!!

We now use Equations (A1) and (A2) to show that lottery 𝐹 must be associated
with greater expected utility according to the definition of first-order stochastic
dominance, which will complete the proof. According to the definition of firstorder stochastic dominance (see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995)),
𝐹 𝑦 ≤ 𝐺 𝑦 for each possible realization 𝑦.

According to strict dominance,

𝜇! > 𝜇! . Then Equations (A1) and (A2) directly imply that:
𝐸 𝑈 𝑦 𝐹 − 𝐸 𝑈 𝑦 𝐺 = 𝜇! − 𝜇! − 𝜂 𝜆 − 1 ∗
!!
𝐹
!!

𝑦 𝑑𝑦 + 𝜂 𝜆 − 1

!!
𝐺
!!

!!
𝐹
!!

𝑦 𝑑𝑦 +

𝑦 𝑑𝑦.

If the above expression is strictly positive under strict dominance, then this will
complete the proof. Since 𝜂 𝜆 − 1 ∗

!!
𝐹
!!

𝑦 𝑑𝑦 ≤ 𝜂 𝜆 − 1 ∗

!!
𝐺
!!

𝑦 𝑑𝑦

by definition, then to prove Proposition 0a, it is only necessary to show that:
𝜇! − 𝜇! > 𝜂 𝜆 − 1 ∗

!!

𝐹 𝑦 𝑑𝑦 .

!!

To prove this desired relationship, note that if 𝜂 𝜆 − 1 < 1, then:
𝜇! − 𝜇! =

!!

1 ∗ 𝑑𝑦 ≥

!!

!!

𝐹 𝑦 𝑑𝑦 > 𝜂 𝜆 − 1

!!

!!

𝐹 𝑦 𝑑𝑦 . ∎

!!

Proof of Proposition 1a:
Suppose that lottery 𝐹 exhibits strict first-order stochastic dominance over 𝐺.
We will show that if 𝜂𝜆 < 1/2, then the expected utility associated with lottery 𝐹
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strictly exceeds the expected utility associated with 𝐺 , 𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! 𝐹 >
𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! 𝐺 .
From Equation (4.1), the expected utility for lottery 𝐹 is:
!

𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! |𝐹 = 𝜇! + 𝜂 1 − 𝛼𝐻! 𝜇!
!!

+ 𝜂𝜆 1 + 𝛼𝐻! 𝜇!

!!

𝑦!!! − 𝜇! 𝑓 𝑦 𝑑𝑦

!!

𝑦!!! − 𝜇! 𝑓(𝑦)𝑑𝑦.

Following the sequence of steps in the proof of Proposition 0a previously in the
appendix, this expected utility can be written in the following form:
𝐴3

𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! |𝐹 = 𝜇! − 𝜂

𝜆 − 1 + 𝛼 𝜆 + 1 𝐻! 𝜇!

!!

𝐹 𝑦 𝑑𝑦.

!!

We can then provide a parallel expression for the expected utility of lottery 𝐺:
𝐴4

𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! |𝐺 = 𝜇! − 𝜂

𝜆 − 1 + 𝛼 𝜆 + 1 𝐻! 𝜇!

!!

𝐺 𝑦 𝑑𝑦.

!!

The difference between the expected utilities is captured by
𝐴5

𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! 𝐹 − 𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! 𝐺
= 𝜇! − 𝜇!
−𝜂

𝜆 − 1 + 𝛼 𝜆 + 1 𝐻! 𝜇!

!!

𝐹 𝑦 𝑑𝑦 −

!!

!!

𝐺 𝑦 𝑑𝑦 .

!!

If 𝛼𝐻! 𝜇! = 0, then it follows from Proposition 0a that 𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! |𝐹
𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! |𝐺

> 0. Then note that 𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! |𝐹

− 𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! |𝐺

−

is monotonic

with respect to 𝛼𝐻! 𝜇! ∈ 0,1 with
𝑑 𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! 𝐹 − 𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! 𝐺
𝑑 𝛼𝐻! 𝜇!

=𝜂 𝜆+1

!!

𝐺 𝑦 𝑑𝑦 −

!!

𝑑 ! 𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! 𝐹 − 𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! 𝐺
𝑑 𝛼𝐻! 𝜇!
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!

!!
!!

= 0.

𝐹 𝑦 𝑑𝑦 ,

As a result, if 𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! 𝐹 − 𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! 𝐺 > 0 under the most extreme form
of sensitization, 𝛼𝐻! 𝜇! = 1, then 𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! 𝐹 − 𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! 𝐺 > 0 will hold
true for all intermediate levels of sensitization 𝛼𝐻! 𝜇! ∈ (0,1).
For the remainder of this proof, suppose that sensitization takes on its most
extreme form possible, with 𝛼𝐻! 𝜇! = 1. Then given

!!
𝐹
!!

𝑦 𝑑𝑦 ≤ 𝜇! − 𝜇!

and given Equation (𝐴5):
𝐴6

𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! 𝐹 − 𝐸 𝑈 𝑦!!! 𝐺
≥ (𝜇! − 𝜇! )(1 − 2𝜂𝜆) + 2𝜂𝜆

!!

𝐺 𝑦 𝑑𝑦 −

!!

!!

𝐹 𝑦 𝑑𝑦 .

!!

Since (strict) first-order stochastic dominance guarantees that (𝜇! − 𝜇! ) > 0 and
that

!!
𝐺
!!

𝑦 𝑑𝑦 −

!!
𝐹
!!

𝑦 𝑑𝑦 ≥ 0, we conclude that sensitization is consistent

with first-order stochastic dominance under the parameter restriction 𝜂𝜆 < 1/2. ∎
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Figures

FIGURE 1. THE LIQUIDITY-SCALE TRADEOFF

FIGURE 2. EQUILIBRIUM INTEREST RATES AND INVESTMENT WHEN AGENTS BECOME SENSITIZED BY PRIOR LOSS
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